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多尼倫:The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013

作者:Tom Donilon  2013311日 whitehouse

Thank you, Henrietta, for that kind introduction and for your service, both in government and here at the Asia Society. 
And thank you, Suzanne, for bringing us together today.  I am honored to be with you, especially in these beautiful surroundings.  For almost sixty years, this organization has connected cultures— Asian and American—our ideas, leaders and people.


Of course, one of those people, a real presence here at the Asia Society, was your chairman and my friend of thirty years, Richard Holbrooke.  Richard was famous for his work from the Balkans to South Asia.  But he was also a real Asia hand as the youngest-ever Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia.   Richard dedicated himself to the idea that progress and peace was possible—a lesson we carry forward, not only in Southwest Asia, where he worked so hard, but across the Asia-Pacific.  I’ve come here today because this project has never been more consequential—the future of the United States has never been more closely linked to the economic, strategic and political order emerging in the Asia-Pacific.
Last November, I gave a speech in Washington outlining how the United States is rebalancing our global posture to reflect the growing importance of Asia.  As President Obama’s second term begins, I want to focus on some of the specific challenges that lay ahead. 
This is especially timely because this is a period of transition in Asia.  New leaders have taken office in Tokyo and Seoul.  In Beijing, China’s leadership transition will be completed this week. President Obama and those of us on his national security team have already had constructive conversations with each incoming leader.  We’ll be seeing elections in Malaysia, Australia and elsewhere.  These changes remind us of the importance of constant, persistent U.S. engagement in this dynamic region.
Why Rebalance Toward Asia
Let me begin by putting our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific in context.  Every Administration faces the challenge of ensuring that cascading crises do not crowd out the development of long-term strategies to deal with transcendent challenges and opportunities. 
After a decade defined by 9/11, two wars, and a financial crisis, President Obama took office determined to restore the foundation of the United States’ global leadership—our economic strength at home.  Since then the United States has put in place a set of policies that have put our economy on the path to recovery, and helped create six million U.S. jobs in the last thirty-five months. 
At the same time, renewing U.S. leadership has also meant focusing our efforts and resources not just on the challenges that make today’s headlines, but on the regions that will shape the global order in the decades ahead.  That’s why, from the outset—even before the President took office—he directed those of us on his national security team to engage in a strategic assessment, a truly global examination of our presence and priorities.  We asked what the U.S. footprint and face to the world was and what it ought to be.  We set out to identify the key national security interests that we needed to pursue.  We looked around the world and asked: where are we over-weighted?  Where are we underweighted?
That assessment resulted in a set of key determinations.  It was clear that there was an imbalance in the projection and focus of U.S. power.  It was the President’s judgment that we were over-weighted in some areas and regions, including our military actions in the Middle East.  At the same time, we were underweighted in other regions, such as the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, we believed this was our key geographic imbalance. 
On one level, this reflected a recognition of the critical role that the United States has played in Asia for decades, providing the stabilizing foundation for the region’s unprecedented social and economic development.  Beyond this, our guiding insight was that Asia’s future and the future of the United States are deeply and increasingly linked.  Economically, Asia already accounts for more than one-quarter of global GDP.  Over the next five years, nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia.  This growth is fueling powerful geopolitical forces that are reshaping the region: China’s ascent, Japan’s resilience, and the rise of a “Global Korea,” an eastward-looking India and Southeast Asian nations more interconnected and prosperous than ever before. 
These changes are unfolding at a time when Asia’s economic, diplomatic and political rules of the road are still taking shape.  The stakes for people on both sides of the Pacific are profound.  And the U.S. rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific is also a response to the strong demand signal from leaders and publics across the region for U.S. leadership, economic engagement, sustained attention to regional institutions and defense of international rules and norms. 
What Rebalancing Is, and What It Isn’t
Against this backdrop, President Obama has been clear about the future that the United States seeks. And I would encourage anyone who has not already done so to read the President’s address to the Australian parliament in Canberra in 2011.  It is a definitive statement of U.S. policy in the region; a clarion call for freedom; and yet another example of how, when it comes to the Asia-Pacific, the United States is “all in.” 
As the President explained in Canberra, the overarching objective of the United States in the region is to sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms. 
To pursue this vision, the United States is implementing a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy: strengthening alliances; deepening partnerships with emerging powers; building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China; empowering regional institutions; and helping to build a regional economic architecture that can sustain shared prosperity. 
These are the pillars of the U.S. strategy, and rebalancing means devoting the time, effort and resources necessary to get each one right.  Here’s what rebalancing does not mean.  It doesn’t mean diminishing ties to important partners in any other region.  It does not mean containing China or seeking to dictate terms to Asia.  And it isn’t just a matter of our military presence.  It is an effort that harnesses all elements of U.S. power—military, political, trade and investment, development and our values.
Perhaps most telling, this rebalance is reflected in the most valuable commodity in Washington: the President’s time.  It says a great deal, for instance, that President Obama made the determination that the United States would participate every year in the East Asia Summit at the Head of State level and hold U.S.-ASEAN summits; that he has met bilaterally with nearly every leader in Southeast Asia, either in the region or in Washington; and that he has engaged with China at an unprecedented pace, including twelve face-to-face meetings with Hu Jintao. 
Let me turn to each pillar of our strategy and several of the challenges we face in 2013. 
Alliances
First, we will continue to strengthen our alliances.  For all of the changes in Asia, this much is settled: our alliances in the region have been and will remain the foundation of our strategy.  I feel confident is saying that our alliances are stronger today than ever before. 
Our alliance with Japan remains a cornerstone of regional security and prosperity.  I am not sure American-Japanese friendship has ever been more powerfully manifest than it was two years ago today, on 3/11, after the tsunami and Fukishima nuclear crisis.  As allies and friends, Americans inside and outside government rushed to lend a hand to Japan’s disaster response and recovery. 
That same spirit of solidarity was evident when Japan’s new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, became one of the first foreign leaders President Obama hosted in his second term.  They had excellent discussions on trade, expanding security cooperation, and the next steps toward realigning U.S. forces in Japan. Looking ahead, there is scarcely a regional or global challenge in the President’s second-term agenda where the United States does not look to Japan to play an important role.
With the Republic of Korea, the United States is building on our joint vision for a global alliance and deeper trading partnership.  I just returned from Seoul, where I attended the inauguration of President Park, Korea’s first woman president.  I was struck by how much our leaders have in common in terms of their priorities and vision.  When we met, I conveyed to President Park President Obama’s unwavering commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea, and President Park gave her full support to modernizing our alliance and continuing the effort to partner on a wide range of regional and global issues.  During my visit, President Park accepted President Obama’s invitation to visit Washington, and I can announce today that we look forward to welcoming her to the White House in May.
In Japan and South Korea, the United States can look to new leaders who are firmly committed to close security cooperation with the United States.  This is no accident and no surprise, because polls in both countries show public support for their alliance with the United States in the range of 80 percent.  At the same time, it is clear that, as we look forward, maintaining security in a dynamic region will demand greater trilateral coordination from Japan, Korea and the United States. 
With Australia—following the President’s visit and joint announcement with Prime Minister Gillard of the rotational deployment of U.S. Marines—we are bringing our militaries even closer.  Prime Minister Gillard has been an outstanding partner in our efforts to advance prosperity and security to the Asia-Pacific region.  The United States has reinvigorated longstanding alliances with Thailand and the Philippines to address counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.  Philippine President Aquino’s visit to Washington and President Obama’s visit to Thailand and meeting with Prime Minister Yingluck both speak to another key facet of our strategy—the United States is not only rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, we are rebalancing within Asia to recognize the growing importance of Southeast Asia.  Just as we found that the United States was underweighted in East Asia, we found that the United States was especially underweighted in Southeast Asia.  And we are correcting that. 
In these difficult fiscal times, I know that some have questioned whether this rebalance is sustainable.  After a decade of war, it is only natural that the U.S. defense budget is being reduced.  But make no mistake:  President Obama has clearly stated that we will maintain our security presence and engagement in the Asia-Pacific.  Specifically, our defense spending and programs will continue to support our key priorities – from our enduring presence on the Korean Peninsula to our strategic presence in the western Pacific.
This means that in the coming years a higher proportion of our military assets will be in the Pacific. Sixty percent of our naval fleet will be based in the Pacific by 2020. Our Air Force is also shifting its weight to the Pacific over the next five years. We are adding capacity from both the Army and the Marines.  The Pentagon is working to prioritize the Pacific Command for our most modern capabilities – including submarines, Fifth-Generation Fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, and reconnaissance platforms.  And we are working with allies to make rapid progress in expanding radar and missile defense systems to protect against the most immediate threat facing our allies and the entire region: the dangerous, destabilizing behavior of North Korea.   
North Korea
Let me spend a few moments on North Korea. 
For sixty years, the United States has been committed to ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This means deterring North Korean aggression and protecting our allies.  And it means the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  The United States will not accept North Korea as a nuclear state; nor will we stand by while it seeks to develop a nuclear-armed missile that can target the United States.  The international community has made clear that there will be consequences for North Korea’s flagrant violation of its international obligations, as the UN Security Council did again unanimously just last week in approving new sanctions in response to the North’s recent provocative nuclear test.
U.S. policy toward North Korea rests on four key principles:
First, close and expanded cooperation with Japan and South Korea.  The unity that our three countries have forged in the face of North Korea’s provocations—unity reaffirmed by President Park and Prime Minister Abe —is as crucial to the search for a diplomatic solution as it is to deterrence.  The days when North Korea could exploit any seams between our three governments are over.
And let me add that the prospects for a peaceful resolution also will require close U.S. coordination with China’s new government.  We believe that no country, including China, should conduct “business as usual” with a North Korea that threatens its neighbors.  China’s interest in stability on the Korean Peninsula argues for a clear path to ending North Korea’s nuclear program.  We welcome China’s support at the UN Security Council and its continued insistence that North Korea completely, verifiably and irreversibly abandon its WMD and ballistic missile programs.
Second, the United States refuses to reward bad North Korean behavior.  The United States will not play the game of accepting empty promises or yielding to threats.  As former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has said, we won’t buy the same horse twice.  We have made clear our openness to authentic negotiations with North Korea.  In return, however, we’ve only seen provocations and extreme rhetoric.  To get the assistance it desperately needs and the respect it claims it wants, North Korea will have to change course. Otherwise, the United States will continue to work with allies and partners to tighten national and international sanctions to impede North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.  Today, the Treasury Department is announcing the imposition of U.S. sanctions against the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea, the country’s primary foreign exchange bank, for its role in supporting North Korea’s WMD program. 
By now it is clear that the provocations, escalations and poor choices of North Korea’s leaders are not only making their country less secure – they are condemning their people to a level of poverty that stands in stark contrast not only to South Korea, but every other country in East Asia. 
Third, we unequivocally reaffirm that the United States is committed to the defense of our homeland and our allies.  Recently, North Korean officials have made some highly provocative statements.  North Korea’s claims may be hyperbolic – but as to the policy of the United States, there should be no doubt: we will draw upon the full range of our capabilities to protect against, and to respond to, the threat posed to us and to our allies by North Korea.  This includes not only any North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction—but also, as the President made clear, their transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to other states or non-state entities.  Such actions would be considered a grave threat to the United States and our allies and we will hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences.
Finally, the United States will continue to encourage North Korea to choose a better path.  As he has said many times, President Obama came to office willing to offer his hand to those who would unclench their fists.  The United States is prepared to help North Korea develop its economy and feed its people—but it must change its current course.  The United States is prepared to sit down with North Korea to negotiate and to implement the commitments that they and the United States have made.  We ask only that Pyongyang prove its seriousness by taking meaningful steps to show it will abide by its commitments, honor its words, and respect international law. 
Anyone who doubts the President’s commitment needs look no further than Burma, where new leaders have begun a process of reform.  President Obama’s historic visit to Rangoon is proof of our readiness to start transforming a relationship marked by hostility into one of greater cooperation.  Burma has already received billions in debt forgiveness, large-scale development assistance, and an influx of new investment.  While the work of reform is ongoing, Burma has already broken out of isolation and opened the door to a far better future for its people in partnership with its neighbors and with the United States.  And, as President Obama said in his speech to the people of Burma, we will continue to stand with those who continue to support rights, democracy and reform.  So I urge North Korea’s leaders to reflect on Burma’s experience.  
Emerging Powers
Even as we keep our alliances strong to deal with challenges like North Korea, we continue to carry out a second pillar of our strategy for the Asia-Pacific:  forging deeper partnerships with emerging powers. 
To that end, the President considers U.S. relations with India—the world’s largest democracy—to be “one of the defining partnerships of the twenty-first century.”  From Prime Minister Singh’s visit in 2009 to the President’s trip to India in 2010, the United States has made clear at every turn that we don’t just accept India’s rise, we fervently support it. 
U.S. and Indian interests powerfully converge in the Asia-Pacific, where India has much to give and much to gain. Southeast Asia begins in Northeast India, and we welcome India’s efforts to “look East,” from supporting reforms in Burma to trilateral cooperation with Japan to promoting maritime security.  In the past year, for example, India-ASEAN trade increased by 37 percent to $80 billion. 
The United States has also worked hard to realize Indonesia’s potential as a global partner.  We have put in place a wide-ranging Comprehensive Partnership.  We have welcomed Indonesia’s vigorous participation in the region’s multilateral forums, including hosting APEC and promoting ASEAN unity.  We are also working with Indonesia and Brunei on a major new initiative to mobilize capital to help bring clean and sustainable energy to the Asia-Pacific. And, of course, no U.S. President has ever had closer personal ties to an Asia-Pacific nation than President Obama does with Indonesia—a warm relationship that was on full display in November 2010 when the President visited Jakarta.
China
The third pillar of our strategy is building a constructive relationship with China. The President places great importance on this relationship because there are few diplomatic, economic or security challenges in the world that can be addressed without China at the table and without a broad, productive, and constructive relationship between our countries.  And we have made substantial progress in building such a relationship over the past four years.
As China completes its leadership transition, the Administration is well positioned to build on our existing relationships with Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang and other top Chinese leaders. Taken together, China’s leadership transition and the President’s re-election mark a new phase in U.S.-China relations – with new opportunities.  
Of course, the U.S.-China relationship has and will continue to have elements of both cooperation and competition. Our consistent policy has been to improve the quality and quantity of our cooperation; promote healthy economic competition; and manage disagreements to ensure that U.S. interests are protected and that universal rights and values are respected.  As President Obama has made clear, the United States speaks up for universal values because history shows that nations that uphold the rights of their people are ultimately more successful, more prosperous and more stable.
As President Obama has said many times, the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China.  We do not want our relationship to become defined by rivalry and confrontation.  And I disagree with the premise put forward by some historians and theorists that a rising power and an established power are somehow destined for conflict.  There is nothing preordained about such an outcome.  It is not a law of physics, but a series of choices by leaders that lead to great power confrontation.  Others have called for containment.  We reject that, too.  A better outcome is possible.  But it falls to both sides—the United States and China—to build a new model of relations between an existing power and an emerging one.  Xi Jinping and President Obama have both endorsed this goal. 
To build this new model, we must keep improving our channels of communication and demonstrate practical cooperation on issues that matter to both sides.
To that end, a deeper U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue is central to addressing many of the sources of insecurity and potential competition between us. This remains a necessary component of the new model we seek, and it is a critical deficiency in our current relationship. The Chinese military is modernizing its capabilities and expanding its presence in Asia, drawing our forces into closer contact and raising the risk that an accident or miscalculation could destabilize the broader relationship. We need open and reliable channels to address perceptions and tensions about our respective activities in the short-term and about our long-term presence and posture in the Western Pacific.
It is also critical that we strengthen the underpinnings of our extensive economic relationship, which is marked by increasing interdependence. We have been clear with Beijing that as China takes a seat at a growing number of international tables, it needs to assume responsibilities commensurate with its economic clout and national capabilities. As we engage with China’s new leaders, the United States will encourage them to move forward with the reforms outlined in the country’s twelfth Five Year Plan, including efforts to shift the country away from its dependence on exports toward a more balanced and sustainable consumer-oriented growth model.  The United States will urge a further opening of the Chinese market and a leveling of the playing field.  And the United States will seek to work together with China to promote international financial stability through the G-20 and to address global challenges such as climate change and energy security.
Another such issue is cyber-security, which has become a growing challenge to our economic relationship as well. Economies as large as the United States and China have a tremendous shared stake in ensuring that the Internet remains open, interoperable, secure, reliable, and stable.  Both countries face risks when it comes to protecting personal data and communications, financial transactions, critical infrastructure, or the intellectual property and trade secrets that are so vital to innovation and economic growth. 
It is in this last category that our concerns have moved to the forefront of our agenda. I am not talking about ordinary cybercrime or hacking.  And, this is not solely a national security concern or a concern of the U.S. government.  Increasingly, U.S. businesses are speaking out about their serious concerns about sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business information and proprietary technologies through cyber intrusions emanating from China on an unprecedented scale.  The international community cannot afford to tolerate such activity from any country.  As the President said in the State of the Union, we will take action to protect our economy against cyber-threats.
From the President on down, this has become a key point of concern and discussion with China at all levels of our governments.  And it will continue to be.  The United States will do all it must to protect our national networks, critical infrastructure, and our valuable public and private sector property.  But, specifically with respect to the issue of cyber-enabled theft, we seek three things from the Chinese side.  First, we need a recognition of the urgency and scope of this problem and the risk it poses—to international trade, to the reputation of Chinese industry and to our overall relations.  Second, Beijing should take serious steps to investigate and put a stop to these activities.  Finally, we need China to engage with us in a constructive direct dialogue to establish acceptable norms of behavior in cyberspace.
We have worked hard to build a constructive bilateral relationship that allows us to engage forthrightly on priority issues of concern.  And the United States and China, the world’s two largest economies, both dependent on the Internet, must lead the way in addressing this problem. 
Regional Architecture
This leads to the fourth pillar of our strategy—strengthening regional institutions— which also reflects Asia’s urgent need for economic, diplomatic and security-related rules and understandings.
From the outset, the Obama Administration embarked on a concerted effort to develop and strengthen regional institutions—in other words, building out the architecture of Asia.  And the reasons are clear: an effective regional architecture lowers the barriers to collective action on shared challenges.  It creates dialogues and structures that encourage cooperation, maintain stability, resolve disputes through diplomacy and help ensure that countries can rise peacefully. 
There is no underestimating the strategic significance of this region.  The ten ASEAN countries, stretching across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, have a population of well over 600 million.  Impressive growth rates in countries like Thailand – and a 25-percent increase in international investment in 2011—suggest that ASEAN nations are only going to become more important, politically and economically.
Since taking office, the Obama Administration has signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and appointed the first resident U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN.  As I said, the President has traveled every year to meet with ASEAN’s leaders– and will continue to do so going forward.  The President also has made a decision to participate at the Head of State level every year at the East Asia Summit, consistent with the United States’ goal to elevate the EAS as the premier forum for dealing with political and security issues in Asia. 
Looking ahead, it is clear that territorial disputes in the resource-rich South and East China Seas will test the region’s political and security architecture.  These tensions challenge the peaceful underpinnings of Asia’s prosperity and they have already done damage to the global economy.  While the United States has no territorial claims there, and does not take a position on the claims of others, the United States is firmly opposed to coercion or the use of force to advance territorial claims.  Only peaceful, collaborative and diplomatic efforts, consistent with international law, can bring about lasting solutions that will serve the interests of all claimants and all countries in this vital region.  That includes China, whose growing place in the global economy comes with an increasing need for the public goods of maritime security and unimpeded lawful commerce, just as Chinese businessmen and women will depend on the public good of an open, secure Internet. 
Economic Architecture
Finally, the United States will continue to pursue the fifth element of our strategy: building an economic architecture that allows the people of the Asia-Pacific –including the American people--to reap the rewards of greater trade and growth.  It is our view –and I believe history demonstrates – that the economic order that will deliver the next phase of broad-based growth that the region needs is one that rests on economies that are open and transparent, and trade and investment that are free, fair and environmentally sustainable. U.S. economic vitality also depends on tapping into new markets and customers beyond our borders, especially in the fastest-growing regions. 
And so President Obama has worked with the region’s leaders to support growth-oriented, job-creating policies such as the U.S.- Korea Free Trade Agreement.  The Administration has also worked through APEC and bilaterally to lower economic barriers at and within borders, increase and protect investment, expand trade in key areas, and protect intellectual property. 
The centerpiece of our economic rebalancing is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)—a high-standard agreement the United States is crafting with Asia-Pacific economies from Chile and Peru to New Zealand and Singapore.  The TPP is built on its members’ shared commitment to high standards, eliminating market access barriers to goods and services, addressing new, 21st century trade issues and respect for a rules-based economic framework.  We always envisioned the TPP as a growing platform for regional economic integration.  Now, we are realizing that vision—growing the number of TPP partners from seven when President Obama took office to four more: Vietnam, Malaysia, Canada and Mexico.  Together, these eleven countries represent an annual trading relationship of $1.4 trillion.  The growing TPP is already a major step toward APEC’s vision of a region-wide Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. 
The TPP is also attractive because it is ambitious but achievable.  We can get this done.  In fact, the United States is working hard with the other parties to complete negotiations by the end of 2013.  Let me add that the TPP is intended to be an open platform for additional countries to join – provided they are willing and able to meet the TPP’s high standards
The TPP is part of a global economic agenda that includes the new agreement we are pursuing with Europe—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.  Transatlantic trade is nearly one trillion dollars each year, with $3.7 trillion in investments.  Even small improvements can yield substantial benefits for our people.  Taken together, these two agreements—from the Atlantic to the Pacific—and our existing Free Trade Agreements, around the world could account for over sixty percent of world trade.  But our goals are strategic as well as economic.  Many have argued that economic strength is the currency of power in the twenty-first century.  And across the Atlantic and Pacific, the United States will aim to build a network of economic partnerships as strong as our diplomatic and security alliances—all while strengthening the multilateral trading system.  The TPP is also an absolute statement of U.S. strategic commitment to be in the Asia-Pacific for the long haul.  And the growth arising from a U.S.-Europe agreement will help underwrite NATO, the most powerful alliance in history. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, I believe President Obama’s strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific is already a signature achievement.  But its full impact will require sustained commitment over the coming years.
I would leave you with a simple thought experiment that says a great deal about the role of the United States in shaping the way forward.  I think it’s fair to ask: without the stabilizing presence of U.S. engagement over the past seventy years, where would the Asia-Pacific be today? 
Without the U.S. guarantee of security and stability, would militarism have given way to peace in Northeast Asia?  Would safe sea lanes have fueled Pacific commerce?  Would South Korea have risen from aid recipient to trading powerhouse?  And would small nations be protected from domination by bigger neighbors?  I think the answer is obvious. 
Credit for the Asia-Pacific’s extraordinary progress in recent decades rightly belongs to the region’s hardworking and talented people.  At the same time, it is fair to say – and many leaders and people across the region would agree—the United States provided a critical foundation for Asia’s rise.
As such, the United States will continue to work to ensure that the Asia-Pacific grows into a place where the rise of new powers occurs peacefully; where the freedom to access the sea, air, space, and cyberspace empowers vibrant commerce; where multinational forums help promote shared interests; and where the universal rights of citizens, no matter where they live, are upheld. 
The Obama Administration has worked to make our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific a reality because the region’s success in the century ahead –and the United States’ security and prosperity in the 21st century—still depend on the presence and engagement of the United States in Asia.  We are a resident Pacific power, resilient and indispensable.  And in President Obama’s second term, this vital, dynamic region will continue to be a strategic priority. Thank you.




白宫首席安全顾问在亚洲协会演讲阐释再平衡战略


作者:Tom Donilon  
龙腾网菲里凌陆译,观察者网岑少宇校注 
2013315日 观察者网

亚洲协会近日举办“新闻头条外的亚洲”(Asia: Beyond the Headlines)系列研讨会。作为研讨会的一部分,2013年3月11日,美国国家安全顾问托马斯·多尼伦(Thomas E. Donilon)在亚洲协会发表题为“2013年的美国与亚太地区”(The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013)的演讲,阐释了奥巴马新政府的亚太地区政策。演讲全文如下

当然,在所有为这一事业做出贡献的人中,有一位值得铭记,他就是贵协会的主席,和我相交30年的好友——理查德·霍尔布鲁克(Richard Holbrooke)。理查德因为他在巴尔干和南亚的工作而闻名,但他也是处理亚洲事务的一把好手,曾是史上最年轻的、负责东亚事务的助理国务卿。理查德致力于他的理念,认为进步和和平都是可能的——我们发扬了这一理念,不仅在他为之奋斗过的西南亚(观察者网注:霍尔布鲁克曾于2009—2010年任阿富汗和巴基斯坦特别代表),而是在整个亚太地区。今天,我之所以到这里,是因为这一项目从未如此重要——美国的未来从未如此紧密地与亚太地区新兴的经济、战略以及政治秩序相联系。
去年11月,我在华盛顿发表演讲,概述了美国将如何再平衡全球态势,以应对亚洲日益增强的重要性。奥巴马总统的第二任期刚刚开始,我将把重点放在所面临的几个具体挑战上。
当下正是亚洲的转型期,因此这种再平衡尤为及时。东京和首尔产生了新领导人,在北京,中国的权力移交将在本周完成。奥巴马总统以及我们这些国家安全团队的成员,已经与那些新领导人进行了富有建设性的对话。未来,马来西亚、澳大利亚及其他地区还将进行选举。这些变化提醒我们,在这一充满变数的地区,美国坚定、持续地介入的重要性。
为何再平衡向亚洲倾斜
请允许我先介绍一下向亚太地区“再平衡”的背景。历届政府都面临相同的挑战:要确保连锁式的危机不会阻碍长期战略的发展,以应对更高层次的挑战和机遇。
提起奥巴马总统就任前的十年,我们想到的是911事件、两场战争和一次金融危机。他在就任后决心重筑美国全球领导地位的基础——美国的经济实力。从那时起,美国实施了一系列政策,将经济带上复苏的轨道,并在过去35个月中为美国创造了600万个就业岗位。
与此同时,恢复美国的领导地位不仅意味着将工作重心和资源集中投向那些在今日成为新闻头条的挑战中,也意味着投向那些将决定未来全球秩序的地区。这就是为什么,从最初开始——甚至在奥巴马总统当选前——他就要求我们这些国家安全团队的成员进行战略评估,对美国的存在和重心作一次真正的全球性审视。我们提的问题是:对世界来说,美国的足迹和面貌是什么样的?应当是什么样的?我们试图定义应对追求的国家安全的关键利益。我们审视全球而问:我们过于重视了何处?我们忽视了何处?
那次评估产生了一系列关键决策。显然,美国力量的投射和聚焦都是不平衡的。总统判断,我们对某些区域和地区过于重视,包括我们在中东的军事行动。同时,我们忽视了其他地区,比如亚太地区。的确如此,我们相信这就是我们最关键的地缘失衡
在某一层面上,这反映出对美国几十年来在亚洲所扮演角色的认可:美国为这一地区社会和经济的空前发展提供了稳定的基础。此外,我们的洞察力富有指导性,即美国与亚洲的未来是密切相关的,而且其联系日益加深。经济上,亚洲已占据全球GDP的1/4强。在今后五年内,除美国外的全球经济增长预计将有近半来自亚洲。这样的增长加强了重塑地区的、强大的地缘政治力量:中国的上升,日本的反弹,还有“全球化的韩国”的崛起,向东转的印度,以及比过去联系更密切、更为繁荣的东南亚国家。
这些变化发生时,亚洲的经济、外交以及政治规则仍在成型过程中。太平洋两岸的赌注都是巨大的。亚太地区的领导人和民众发出强烈的信号,要求美国维持领导地位与经济交往,持续关注地区机制,保护国际法规和准则。美国向亚太地区倾斜的再平衡是这些要求的回应。
再平衡战略的“做”与“不做”
在此背景下,奥巴马总统很清楚美国所期望的未来如何。我希望任何对此尚不明确的人读一读总统2011年在堪培拉对澳大利亚议会做的演讲。那是对美国亚太地区政策的明确宣示;是呼吁自由的号角;也是展示美国在亚太地区如何“全力以赴”的例证。
正如总统在堪培拉所阐释的,美国在亚太地区的首要任务是维持稳定的安全环境和基于经济开放、和平解决争端、尊重普世人权和自由之上的地区秩序。
为实现这一愿景,美国实施了一个全面的、多维战略:强化联盟;深化与新兴大国的伙伴关系;与中国建立稳定、有成效且有建设性的关系;强化区域机制;并帮助建立可以维持共同繁荣的地区经济结构。
这些就是美国战略的支柱,而再平衡意味着将必须的时间、精力和资源投入进去,确保树立起这些支柱。而下面所述的,都是再平衡战略所不包括的。再平衡战略不意味着我们会削弱与任何其他地区的重要伙伴的联系。它不意味着遏制中国或者在亚洲寻求发号施令。它不仅仅是在亚洲的军事存在。它是一项集合了美国国家力量所有要素的努力——军事、政治、贸易与投资、发展,以及我们的价值观。
或许最有说服力的是,再平衡战略将通过华盛顿最有价值的东西来体现:总统的时间。这很有意义,比如,奥巴马总统决定美国每年都将出席东亚首脑级峰会,将举办美国—东盟峰会;他在当地或者华盛顿与几乎每一位东南亚领导人举行过双边会谈;他以前所未有的步调与中国密切交往,包括12次与胡锦涛面对面会谈。
接下来我将逐一解说美国再平衡战略的每一个支柱,以及我们在2013年可能遭遇的一些挑战。
联盟
首先,我们将继续强化我们的联盟。在亚洲发生的所有变化中,这是板上钉钉的:我们在该地区的联盟一直是,并将继续是我们战略的基石。我十分肯定地说我们的联盟比以前任何时候都要牢固。
我们和日本的联盟任是地区安全和繁荣的基石。我不太确定美日友谊是否可能比两年前的今天,即311地震海啸及福岛核危机时表现得更为明确。作为盟友和朋友,政府内外的美国人急切地伸出援手,帮助日本应对危机并从中恢复。
同样的团结精神也体现在日本新首相安倍晋三的访问中,他是奥巴马总统在第二任期中在美国会见的第一位外国元首。他们在贸易、增进安保合作以及继续调整美军在日部署等方面进行了很好的探讨。展望未来,在总统的第二任期内,他希望日本在几乎所有的地区和全球挑战中发挥重要作用。
美国正与韩国一起建立对于全球联盟以及深化贸易伙伴关系的共同愿景。我刚从首尔返回,在那里,我参加了韩国第一位女总统朴槿惠的就职典礼。我们两国领导人在其工作重心以及愿景上有如此多的共同之处,这深深地触动了我。当我们会面时,我向朴总统转达了奥巴马总统保卫韩国的从未动摇的承诺,朴总统表示全力支持与时俱进地发展两国联盟,以及深化在地区及全球问题上的伙伴关系。在我访问期间,朴总统接受了奥巴马总统的邀请,将访问华盛顿。今日,我可以宣布,我们期待着在5月迎接她到访白宫。
美国可以指望日韩的新领导人将坚定地致力于和美国在安保事务上的密切合作。这既不是意外也不是惊喜,因为两国的民调都显示他们国内有80%的人支持与美国联盟。同时,当我们展望未来时,在这样一个活跃地区维持安全明显需要更多的美日韩三方合作。
在总统访问澳大利亚并与杰拉德总理就美国海军陆战队轮驻澳大利亚发表共同声明后,我们两国的军事关系更近了一步。杰拉德总理在致力于增进亚太地区的繁荣与安定上是杰出的伙伴。为解决反恐、人道主义救援以及救灾等问题,美国重新强化了与泰国和菲律宾的长期联盟关系。菲律宾总统阿基诺访问华盛顿,以及奥巴马总统出访泰国与英拉总理会面,都显示了我国战略的另一个重要方面——美国的“再平衡”不仅在向亚太倾斜,在亚洲内部也有所调整,以反映东南亚日益增长的重要性。正如我们发现美国忽视了东亚,我们也发现东南亚尤其被美国所忽视。而我们正在改正这个错误。
在财政艰难的日子里,我明白有些人会怀疑这样的再平衡是否可持续。经过十年的战争,很自然美国的军事预算会被削减。但是别弄错了:奥巴马总统明确的表明,我们将维持在亚太地区的安保存在与介入。尤为重要的是,我国的国防支出和项目将继续为关键的战略重心提供支持——从我国在朝鲜半岛的持续存在到我们在西太平洋的战略存在。
这意味着,在今后几年内,我国部署在太平洋的军事力量将占更高的比例。到2020年,将有60%的舰队被部署在太平洋。我国的空军也将在接下来的五年内将重心向太平洋移动。我们还正从陆军和海军陆战队腾出力量。五角大楼正致力于提高太平洋司令部在更新装备上的优先级——包括潜艇、F-22和F-35等五代战斗机,以及侦察平台。同时我们还与盟友合作,在扩大雷达和导弹防御体系上取得快速进展,以保护我们的盟友和整个地区免受最大、最直接的威胁——朝鲜危险而不稳定的活动。
朝鲜
让我花点时间说说朝鲜。
在过去的60年里,美国一直致力于确保朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定。这意味着阻止朝鲜的进攻并保护我们的盟友,这还意味着使朝鲜半岛彻底的无核化。美国不会接纳朝鲜成为核国家;我们也不会坐视其发展出可以装载核弹头、能瞄准美国的导弹。国际社会已经清楚地表明,朝鲜明目张胆地违背其国际义务是要承担后果的。联合国安理会上周再次一致通过对朝鲜最近挑衅性的核试验的新制裁。
美国的对朝政策建立在四点关键原则上:
首先,与日韩进行密切、广泛的合作。朴总统和安倍首相都再次确认了我们的联盟。我们三国是为应对朝鲜的挑衅而联合在一起的,这种合作在寻求外交解决上和威慑朝鲜上一样重要。朝鲜可以利用我们三国政府间嫌隙的日子一去不返了。
我还要补充,寻求和平解决朝鲜问题还要求美国和中国新政府密切合作。我相信没有一个国家,包括中国在内,在朝鲜威胁邻国后,会和朝鲜展开“如常的贸易”。朝鲜半岛的稳定符合中国的利益,这为我们指出了一条终止朝鲜核计划的清晰道路。我们欢迎中国在安理会的支持以及一直以来对朝鲜彻底的、可核查的、不可逆的放弃大规模杀伤性武器和弹道导弹计划的要求。
其次,美国不会因为朝鲜的恶劣行径让步。美国不会接受空洞的承诺,也不会受人威胁。正如前国防部长盖茨所说,我们不会为了一匹马付两次钱。我们清楚表明接受朝鲜务实的谈判。然而,我们仅仅等到了挑衅和极度空洞的辞藻。为了获取急需的援助和宣称希冀的尊重,朝鲜必须洗心革面。否则,美国会继续与盟友和伙伴们努力,通过加强单边及国际制裁来迫使朝鲜放弃其导弹和核计划。今天,财政部宣布美国对朝鲜主要的外汇银行——朝鲜对外贸易银行正式实施制裁,因为这家银行在支持朝鲜的大规模杀伤性武器计划中有重要作用。
现在事情很清楚了,朝鲜的挑衅、事态的升级以及朝鲜领导人的错误选择不仅仅使这个国家日益不安定,而且使自己的民众陷入如此之深的贫穷,以至于该国不仅与韩国形成极鲜明的对比,且与所有其他东亚国家都无法相提并论。
第三,我们明确重申,美国承诺保护自己的国土以及我们的盟友。近期,朝鲜官员发表了一些强烈挑衅的声明。朝鲜的口气或许夸张——然而美国的政策毋庸置疑:我们将全力保护本国及盟友,应对朝鲜的威胁。这不仅适用于朝鲜使用大规模杀伤性武器的情况,而且如总统声明的,同样适用于朝鲜将核武器或者核原料转交给他国或者非国家实体的情况。此类行为将被视为对美国及其盟国最严重的威胁,我们将让朝鲜为此承担全部后果。
最后,美国将继续鼓励朝鲜选择更光明的道路。正如奥巴马总统多次重申,他的手永远为那些愿意松开拳头的人伸出。美国已准备好帮助朝鲜发展经济,养活它的子民——但它必须转变现在的道路。美国准备好和朝鲜坐下来沟通,并履行双方所达成的全部承诺。我们仅仅要求平壤政府通过切实的行动,证明其遵守承诺、信守诺言、尊重国际法的诚意。
任何怀疑总统的承诺的人看看缅甸就行了,他们的新领导刚启动了改革进程。奥巴马总统对仰光历史性的访问证明,我们时刻准备着将被认为是敌对的关系转变成更好的合作。缅甸已经获得了数十亿美元的债务减免,大规模的发展援助,以及大量的新增投资。当改革还在进行中的时候,缅甸就已与邻国和美国建立伙伴关系,从而打破了孤立,为其人民打开了通向更光明未来的大门。并且就像奥巴马总统在对缅甸人民的演讲中所说的,我们将继续与那些支持人权、民主和改革的人站在一起。因此,我敦促朝鲜领导人学习缅甸的经验。
新兴大国
尽管我们保持着强大的联盟以应对朝鲜这样的挑战,我们同时还建设了亚太战略的第二根支柱:打造与新兴大国的更深的伙伴关系。
在这一方面,总统考虑的是美国和印度——全球最大的民主国家的关系,这是“21世纪决定性的伙伴关系之一”。从辛格总理2009年的来访到2010年总统出访印度,美国清楚地表明,我们不仅接受印度的崛起,我们还给予热诚的支持。
美国和印度的利益在亚太地区有强烈的共鸣,印度在亚太地区可有很大贡献,也可收获很多利益。东南亚从印度东北开始,我们也欢迎印度“向东看”的战略,从支持缅甸改革,到与日本和美国增进海事安保的三方合作。去年,印度与东盟的贸易增加了37%,达到800亿美元。
美国还努力的实现印尼作为国际伙伴的潜在价值。我们建立了多领域的全面伙伴关系。我们欢迎印尼积极参加本地区的多边论坛,包括主办亚太经合组织会议以及促进东盟的团结。我们还和印尼以及汶莱合作,推出新的重大举措以拉动资本,从而为亚太地区提供清洁、可持续的能源。而且,很显然的,没有哪位美国总统与亚太国家的私人关系能像奥巴马总统与印尼那么亲密(观察者网注:奥巴马6至10岁时在印尼居住就学)——当总统2010年11月访问雅加达时,一段温馨的关系完全展现在大众的面前。
中国
我们战略的第三根支柱是与中国建立建设性的关系。总统认为这一关系举足轻重,因为如果没有中国出席,或没有与中国建立广泛、富有成效并且建设性的关系,几乎无法解决任何外交、经济、或安保的挑战。在过去的四年里,我们在建立如上所述的双边关系上取得了长足进展。
随着中国完成权力交接,美国政府已经做好准备继续与习近平、李克强和其他中国领导人建设已有的双边关系。把中国的权力交接和美国的总统连任放在一起看,这标志着中美关系的一个新篇章——充满了新的机遇。
当然,中美关系一直并将继续包括合作与竞争。我们一贯的政策是增进合作的质与量;推进经济的良性竞争;正确处理分歧,以保护美国利益不受损害,保障普世人权和价值受到尊重。正如奥巴马总统所明确表示的,美国宣扬普世价值,因为历史表明,捍卫本国民众权利的国家终将更为成功,更为繁荣,也更为稳定。
奥巴马总统多次说过,美国欢迎一个和平、繁荣的中国的崛起。我们不希望两国的关系被定义为对抗和对峙。我也不认同某些历史学家和理论家设定的前提:新兴大国和现有大国不管怎样都注定会发生冲突。这样的结果并不是注定的。这可不是什么物理定律,而是领导人做出的一系列决策导致大国的对抗。还有人呼吁限制中国,我们同样反对这种想法。可以有更好的结果。但这要双方一起努力——中国和美国携手——建立新兴大国与现有大国间的新型关系模式。习近平和奥巴马总统都认可这一目标。
为了建立这一新模式,我们必须持续改进沟通渠道,并在事关双方利益的问题上实现切实的合作。
在这一方面,更深层次的中美军事对话是解决很多不安定根源和双方潜在竞争的核心。这仍是我们寻求的新模式的一个必备要素,也是我们目前双边关系的一个重要缺陷。中国军队正在使其作战能力现代化,并且正扩张其在亚洲的存在,使得我们的军队与其更近距离地接触,增加了因意外或误判导致更广泛的关系出现不稳的风险。我们需要建立一条畅通可靠的渠道来交换看法,并缓解由于双方各自的短期行为和在西太平洋的长期存在与部署所造成的紧张。
强化双方广范的经济合作的基础也十分关键,尤其是在双方日益互相依赖之时。我们向北京清楚地表明,随着中国在越来越多的国际组织和机构中占有一席之地,中国需要逐渐担负起与其经济影响力和国家实力相称的责任。在我们和中国的新领导层打交道的过程中,美国会鼓励他们实施在十二五计划中列出的改革计划,包括将中国从出口导向型转为更加平衡、更可持续的以消费为导向的发展模式。美国会敦促中国进一步开放市场,并消除市场中的障碍。美国也会寻求与中国通过G-20组织共同提高国际金融稳定性,并解决诸如气候变化和能源安全等全球挑战。
另一个类似的问题是网络安全,这也对我们的经济关系形成了日益增强的挑战。大如中美这样的经济体在确保互联网的开放性、可互操作性、安全性、可靠性和稳定性上有巨大的共同利益。两国在保护个人信息以及通讯、金融交易、关键基础设施,或知识产权以及贸易机密等方面都面临着风险,这些方面对于经济增长和创新至关重要。
在关于中国的最后一部分提到的这个问题,已被提升为双方议事日程的最优先事项。我不是说一般的网络犯罪或黑客攻击。这也不仅仅是美国国家安全问题或美国政府的担忧。美国商业界越来越多地表达出他们的严重关切,来自中国的网络攻击达到了空前的程度,正以复杂的技术,有针对性地盗取机密商业信息和专利技术。国际社会决不能容忍任何国家做出这样的行为。正如总统在国情咨文中说的,我们会采取行动保护我们的经济免受网络威胁的影响。
自总统以下,这已经成为一项关注的焦点,也是我们各级政府和中国交涉的重点。而且,这将持续下去。美国会尽一切可能保护我们国家的网络、关键基础设施以及我们重要的公私领域财产。但是,具体到网络盗窃问题,我们希望从中国得到三点回复。首先,我们需要中国政府认同这件事情的紧迫性和广泛性,以及这类事件对国际贸易、中国产业的声誉和两国全面关系的危险性。其次,北京政府应当采取严厉措施调查并制止此类事件。最后,我们需要中国政府与我们进行建设性的直接对话,以建立双方均可接受的网络空间行为准则。
我们已努力建立建设性的双边关系,希望使双方可以在最关心的问题上坦率交流。而且,中美两国作为世界上最大的两个经济体都依赖于网络,因此必须在解决这一问题上做出表率。
地区架构
这就引出了我们战略的第四根支柱——强化地区机制——这也是亚洲急切需求经济、外交以及安全相关的规则的反映。
从一开始,奥巴马政府就始终如一地推进着地区机制的发展与强化——换言之,建立亚洲的架构。原因很显然:一个有效的地区架构可以降低障碍,使应对共同挑战的协作更容易达成。它形成了鼓励合作,维持稳定,通过外交手段解决争议,以及确保各国和平崛起的对话和格局。不要低估这一地区的战略重要性。东盟十国地跨印度洋和太平洋,人口超过六亿。泰国等国的增长率令人印象深刻——国际投资在2011年增加了25%——意味着东盟国家在政治和经济方面都越来越重要。
自从当选以来,奥巴马政府签署了东盟友好合作条约,并向东盟派出首位常驻使节。正如我所说的,总统每年都与东盟国家领导人会面,并将继续如此。总统还决定每年都出席国家元首级的东亚峰会,这与美国将东亚峰会提升为解决亚洲政治和安全问题的主要论坛的目标相一致。
展望未来,很明显在资源丰富的东海和南海,领土纠纷将考验本地区的政治和安全架构。这些紧张形势威胁到了亚洲繁荣的和平基础,并已经对全球经济造成了伤害。尽管美国在那里没有领土主张,也不为任何一国的领土主张持有什么立场,但美国坚决反对一切强行或使用武力推进领土诉求的行为。只有和平的、共同推进的、符合国际法的外交手段,才能带来符合这一关键地区各国及纠纷各方利益的长期解决方案。这也包括中国。中国在全球经济中的地位持续上升,伴随着对于公共的海事安全以及顺畅的、法治的商业环境日益增长的渴求,正如中国的商人们将依赖于公共的、开放安全的互联网一样。
经济架构
最后,美国将继续推进我们战略的第五根支柱的建设:建立一种可靠的经济架构,使亚太地区人民——包括美国人民——都可以享受更大规模的贸易和经济增长带来的回报。在我们的观点中——并且我相信历史会证明——该地区所需要的、将带来基础广泛的增长期的经济秩序,一定是开放透明的,贸易和投资是自由、公平和环境可持续的。美国经济的活力也依赖于打开国外的新市场,寻找新客户,尤其是在那些高速增长的地区。
因此,奥巴马总统与本地区的领导人们协作,支持那些以增长为导向,创造就业岗位的经济政策,例如美韩自贸协定。美国政府还通过亚太经合组织以及双边谈判降低跨国的和各国国内的贸易壁垒,增加并保护投资,在关键地区扩大贸易,以及保护知识产权。
我们经济再平衡的核心策略就是跨太平洋伙伴关系(TPP)——美国正在与从智利、秘鲁到新西兰、新加坡的亚太经济体共同打造的高标准协议。TPP建立在成员的共同承诺之上——追求更高的标准,消除商品和服务的准入壁垒,解决21世纪新的贸易纠纷,并且尊重建立在规则之上的经济框架。我们一直希望TPP成为地区经济整合的一个不断壮大的平台。目前,我们正在实现这一目标——协议签署国在奥巴马总统当选时的七个之上又增加了四个:越南、马来西亚、加拿大和墨西哥。这11个国家加起来,拥有1.4万亿美元的年贸易额。增长中的TPP已成为向亚太经合组织建立本地区自由贸易区的目标迈进的重要一步。
TPP目标远大且有实现的可能,因此颇具吸引力。我们能做得到。事实上,美国与其他各方一同努力,争取在2013年底前完成谈判。请容我赘言,TPP本就设计为开放的平台,任何想要加入的国家,只要能够达到TPP的高标准就可加入。
TPP是全球经济新进程的一部分,其他还包括我们正与欧洲探讨的伙伴关系——跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴关系。跨大西洋贸易额大约是每年1万亿美元,投资额则为3.7万亿美元。哪怕仅仅是小小的改善也能为我们的人民带来丰厚的回报。将这两个协议放在一起——从大西洋到太平洋——以及我们已有的自贸协定,全球超过60%的贸易额都被囊括在内。但是我们的目标除了经济上的还有战略上的。很多人认为经济力量就是21世纪的力量通货。并且美国将要建立跨大西洋和太平洋的,同我们的外交与安全联盟一样牢固的经济网络——全部有赖于多边贸易体系的加强。TPP还是美国在亚太地区的长期战略承诺的绝对声明。而美国和欧洲的贸易协定所带来的增长,将成为历史上最强大的联盟——北约的有力保障。
总结
综上所述,我相信奥巴马总统在亚太地区的战略聚焦已经成为一项特征性的成就。但是要发挥它的全面作用,需要在今后数年内持续地投入。
我想留给大家一个小小的问题,可以解释美国在开拓前路上发挥的作用。我觉得我可以这么问:如果过去的70年里,亚太地区没有美国作为维持稳定的存在与介入,现今会变成什么样?
没有美国担保的安全与稳定,东北亚地区的军国主义会给和平让路吗?还会有安全的海上航线助力太平洋商业发展吗?韩国能从援助接受国成为如今的贸易强国吗?小国能得到保护,从而不受更强的邻居支配吗?我想答案是显而易见的。
亚太地区在最近几十年里非凡的进展当然是本地区勤奋和有才干的人民的功劳。与此同时,我觉得也可以说——本地区的很多领导人和民众也会认同——美国为亚洲崛起提供了关键的基础。
因此,美国将会继续确保亚太地区成为新的大国和平崛起的地方;确保这里的海洋、天空、宇宙和网络空间都是自由的,能为活跃的贸易提供动力;确保这里的多边论坛帮助推进获得共同的利益;并确保民众的普世人权将得到保护,无论他们身在何处。
奥巴马政府正努力使我们倾向亚太地区的战略再平衡得以实现,因为在本世纪接下来的岁月中,这一地区的成功——以及美国在21世纪的安全和繁荣——仍然要依靠美国在亚洲的存在和介入。我们是太平洋的本地大国,富有弹性,不可或缺。在奥巴马总统的第二任期中,这一活跃多变的重要地区将继续是我们的一个战略重心。谢谢。
(龙腾网菲里凌陆译,观察者网岑少宇校注)

原文链接:http://www.guancha.cn/TuoMaSi%C2%B7DuoNiLun/2013_03_15_131934_s.shtml


相蓝欣:中美互信不应止步技术层面
作者:相蓝欣 2013325日 环球时报

中国领导人从2011年末开始,提出构建中美新型大国关系,美国方面一直三缄其口。日前,白宫国家安全顾问多尼伦就如何构建美中新型大国关系进行阐述,首次就此做出公开详细回应。多尼伦的演讲无疑是中美关系改善的一个开端,但是我们必须对美方的思路有足够了解。至少,他刻意回避了新型大国关系如何界定的话题不谈两国长远的共同政治基础,直接提出建立这种关系的先决条件。也就是说,政治互信将取决于中国对美方要求的条件是否接受。相比2005年副国务卿佐利克提出的“负责任的利益攸关”论和2009年副国务卿斯坦伯格的“战略再保证”论,多尼伦的观点不能算是一个进步
  习近平2012年2月访美前在《华盛顿邮报》的书面采访中一针见血地指出,“当前亚太国家最关心的是保持经济繁荣、维护经济增长和区域合作势头。在人心思安定、人心思发展之际,人为地突出军事安全议程,刻意加强军事部署、强化军事同盟,恐怕并不是本地区绝大多数国家希望看到的”。但美方一直对此没有做正面回应,继续坚持把建立军事优势放在美中关系的首位。多尼伦的演讲虽然对美国亚太战略的咄咄逼人姿态有所收敛,但只谈建立“新型大国关系”的条件与过程,不谈目标和结果,显然还是突出军事议题的思维定势。比如,他把军事互信放在首位,声称美中要举行更深层次的军事对话,这种对话是“新模式”的必要组成部分。他认为中国正扩大亚洲军事存在,加大了两国因错估或突发事件而造成关系大局不稳的风险。他开出的另一个条件是网络安全对话。
  危机管控固然必要,但亚太地区的紧张局势与美国的新遏制战略有关。建立军事上的危机管理机制本来就是冷战期间开始的,说明美国的现行亚太战略是从遏制角度来思考的。美国的这种思维定势难以改变,因为其源头是大国兴衰论,这是一种刻意强调军事实力的消长而决定国际关系走向的理论。军事决定论与中国的儒家学说是相悖的。正如基辛格所言,中国人从来不以建立精神上的“希望之乡”为借口夺取别人的土地。因为中国人的“希望之乡”就在中国,而中国人长期在那里生息,没有民族大迁徙。而从大国兴衰论的视角来看,中国不可避免地要成为19世纪末的日本和德国
应当承认,中国对新型大国关系的诠释也是不明确的别的不说,何谓“大国”? 外交系统的正式说法是“major country”(主要国家),新华社称“big power”(大强国), 还有不少媒体称为“big country”(土地人口众多的国家)。造成这种概念混乱的原因只有一个,即避开西方惯用的great power(列强),因为这个概念曾经属于侵略中国的那些大国,而中国不在其内。其实,中国如果对外理直气壮地用great power, 那么中国人的思路反而变得清晰,因为中国事实上已经是现存国际关系体制的重要成员,尽管不是这个体制的始作俑者之一。
  当然,中方的概念不清并不是美方坚持军事决定论的理由。如果我们要同美方就建立新型大国关系进行互动,首先应当强调政治互信,并以它引领军事互信。政治互信是根本性问题,包括对双方各自政治体制的包容与不干涉。军事互信的目的是危机管控,说到底还只能算是技术性问题。前苏联过于相信军事互信的政治效果对其体制垮台起到的重要作用。同样,美国朝野也有不少人希望美国在亚太地区的“全场紧逼”的军事态势将迫使中国就范。我们必须吸取前苏联的历史教训。多尼伦提出的是一种狭义的战略互信观,中国必须用广义的战略互信观,即政治互信引领战略互信的总体思路加以回应。在枝节问题上片面作回应,比如网络安全,是不明智的。▲(作者是日内瓦高等国际问题研究院终身教授)



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