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中国拥抱非洲(China’s Embrace of Africa)援助非洲日本无力抗衡中国崎慎弥、牧野爱博

作者:Robert I. Rotberg 2013319China-US Focus
When President Xi Jinping goes to South Africa he will naturally assure Africans of China’s continued friendship,desire to invest, to trade broadly, 
and to assist most of the forty-nine sub-Saharan African countries with their massive new or refurbished infrastructural needs. But he could also inaugurate a strikingly new and more favorable economic relationship with Africa that reflects Africa’s paramount needs.      


China will long continue to desire the oil and gas that sub-Saharan African countries have to sell, and Africa’s copper, cobalt, iron ore, ferrochrome, coltan, timber, and much more.  China wants to grow robustly and Africa in turn requires the resulting Chinese demand for its myriad resources, and even for its agricultural produce, to maintain its own recent growth at about 5 percent a year, on average.

For ten years, and increasingly since 2007 or so, the China-Africa relationship has been symbiotic and mutually rewarding. China, now the world’s largest importer of petroleum, has satisfied a sizable proportion of its own energy needs from Africa, especially from the Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Nigeria. China is also helping to discover new oil deposits in Mozambican Indian Ocean waters. 

 China helps to mine manganese in Gabon, copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo, iron ore in Liberia, and diamonds in Zimbabwe. It purchases many other primary resources, and grows maize and cassava on leased land in several African countries.  It owns major copper and coal mines in Zambia. 

Africans in many of the forty-nine sub-Saharan African countries know that their recent bubble of prosperity builds on China’s own regular rapid economic resurgence. Zambians on the Copperbelt and in the south of the country, where coal is mined, know Chinese firms as employers. In other countries with major resources, Africans know that Chinese companies are digging for rich ores, shipping petroleum back home, or, surprisingly, engaged in large-scale fishing in countries such as Senegal. 

Some Africans come into contact with Chinese-financed Confucian institutes and think tanks, travel to China on Chinese-provided bursaries, enter one of the thirty-nine Chinese embassies that now serve African-Chinese relations, or hear or read news supplied by China, especially in Kenya.

But most Africans interact with Chinese more frequently on construction projects.  One-third of all of the construction in Africa is in Chinese hands.  Indeed, 75 percent of all Chinese investment in Africa goes into infrastructure.  That amounts to at least $50 billion being spent on the revamping of roads in Kenya, Malawi, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and on and on; on refurbishing major railways in Tanzania, Nigeria, Gabon, and many other places; on new bridges in many countries; on harbors in places such as Angola and Ghana; and on massive hydroelectric supplying dams across major rivers in Ethiopia, the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia; on coal-fired power plant installations in Botswana,  on the new African Union flagship headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; on the Sudan’s pipeline; on new space age communications facilities for the Congo and Nigeria; on a military training college in Zimbabwe; and on stadia for football (soccer) and political rallies almost everywhere. The list is endless and impressive.  As former British Prime Minister Tony Blair commented, “If you tell the Chinese you want a road, the next day someone is out there with a shovel.”


由中國政府援建的非盟會議中心

This is all to Africa’s good and to China’s benefit (as it purchases oil, minerals, and so on). But the striking disparity in the relationship is that Chinese enterprises and construction operations in Africa employ many fewer Africans in unskilled laboring positions than they obviously could. Earlier investors and colonial overlords never dirtied their own hands, giving jobs and transferring at least some skills to Africans. China is notorious for doing far less than it might, and for transferring very few technological or other skills to Africa. China regularly imports labor from China to perform work that Africans might, and that its peoples and its trade unions are ready to supply. Meanwhile, millions of Chinese are in Africa constructing, trading, investing, farming, and so on. Chinese soldiers guard pipelines and train pilots to fly Chinese jets. 

Formal unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa now averages 40 percent or more. In some countries, such as Zimbabwe, unemployment rates range upwards to 80 percent. Even in relatively wealthy South Africa, there are massive numbers of Africans without work. And in Zambia, where there are substantial Chinese-run mining enterprises, formal wage unemployment levels are about 40 percent.  (Official figures in many countries may be lower, but these numbers are often under-estimated.) 

When President Xi Jinping sits down with African leaders he could gain much favor by promising to end the “employ Chinese” preference. If he fails to comes to terms with Africa’s real human needs in this way, Africans may sooner or later decide that it is in their collective interest to bargain not bilaterally with China, as the forty-nine nations now do, but multilaterally – as the African Union or, more likely as the Southern African Development Community, the East African Community, the Economic Commission of the West African States, and so on. By doing so, the nations of sub-Saharan Africa will be able to exert greater leverage, trading their oil or copper (which China wants) for greater employment as well as the massive construction that is now under way across the sub-continent. 

Helping resolve Africa’s real job shortage crisis in this way would greatly boost China’s global and African standing. It would also assist in fending off African complaints that the importation of Chinese trade goods (mattresses, tee shirts, shoes, and the like) undercuts African manufacturing efforts and inhibits the development of indigenous mercantile pursuits. Several Nigerian textile plants have closed because of the availability of inexpensive cloth from China. In Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, local merchants claim that Chinese chickens are sold in the markets so cheaply that local chicken merchants cannot compete. 

If Africa is to prosper and her peoples to enter the global village, China’s sustained avarice for Africa’s resources will provide the means. If China falters, Africa loses. But relations between China and Africa could also become even more mutually beneficial than they now are if China created jobs as well as royalty payments to countries and rulers, and if China supported rather than competed with embryonic African commercial entities. 

Robert I. Rotberg is the inaugural Fulbright Research Chair in Political Development at the Balsillie School of International Affairs and Visiting Fulbright Scholar at CIGI. Robert is the founding director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and was previously professor of political science at MIT, academic vice president of Tufts University and president of Lafayette College.

原文链接:http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinas-embrace-of-africa/


中国拥抱非洲
作者:Robert I. Rotberg 2013319China-US Focus /观察者译


习近平主席访问南非时,他肯定会让非洲人感到中国持续的友谊以及中国投资、发展贸易并帮助撒哈拉以南国家大规模新建或整修基础设施的愿望。但他还可能与非洲建立一种体现非洲首要需求、更能发挥促进作用的全新经济关系
中国会在很长一段时间内继续渴求撒哈拉以南非洲国家出口的石油和天然气,还有非洲的铜、钴、铁矿石、铬铁合金、钶钽铁矿、木材以及其他各种资源。中国希望实现强劲增长,而非洲反过来有赖于中国对其众多资源,甚至是农产品的需求,以维持近期平均5%的年增长率
10年来,尤其是在大约2007年之后,中非关系一直朝互惠互利的方向发展。现为全世界最大石油进口国的中国通过非洲,特别是苏丹、赤道几内亚、安哥拉尼日利亚,满足了自身相当大一部分的能源需求。中国还协助勘探莫桑比克在印度洋海域的新油田。
在49个撒哈拉以南非洲国家中,大国数国家的人都知道,他们近期表面上的繁荣建立在中国快速经济崛起的基础之上。
一些非洲人与中国资助的孔子学院和智库接触,依靠中国提供的奖学金前往中国学习,为数十个为中非关系服务的中国大使馆工作,还有人阅读或听中国发布的新闻,尤其是在肯尼亚。
但大多数非洲人更频繁地通过建设项目与中国人接触。非洲三分之一的建设项目掌握在中国人手中。事实上,中国对非洲的投资75%用于基础设施
这完全有益于非洲,也符合中国的利益。但中非关系中突出的不平衡之处是,在非洲的中国企业和建筑项目,雇用的非技术劳动岗位非洲人数量比他们能够雇用的少得多。早先的投资者和殖民统治者从不弄脏自己的手,他们给非洲人工作机会,还把至少一些技术传授给非洲人。但中国以向非洲传授极少的技术和其他技能而名声不佳中国经常从国内向非洲输送工人,从事非洲人有能力做的工作。与此同时,数百万中国人目前在非洲,开展建筑、贸易、投资、农业等活动。中国士兵守卫油气管道,还培训飞行员驾驶中国飞机。
撒哈拉以南非洲国家的官方失业率目前为平均40%左右。在津巴布韦等一些国家,失业率最高达到80%。即使在相对富裕的南非,也有大量非洲人失业。在有众多中国经营的采矿企业的赞比亚,官方失业率约为40%。
当习近平主席与非洲领导人坐下来会谈时,他如果承诺结束优先“雇用中国人”的政策,会赢得好感。如果他不能以这种方式对待非洲真正的需求,非洲人迟早会认定,放弃49个撒哈拉以南非洲国家现在的做法,即与中国单边谈判,改为由非盟、南部非洲发展共同体、东非共同体、西非国家经济共同体等出面进行多边谈判,以符合他们的集体利益。这样一来,撒哈拉以南非洲将有能力发挥更大的影响,用中国需要的石油和铜换取更多的就业机会。
以这种方式帮助解决非洲真正的就业岗位短缺危机将极大地提升中国在全世界和非洲的地位。这还有助于驳斥非洲人的抱怨,即进口中国贸易品(床垫、鞋、T恤衫等)破坏了非洲发展制造业的努力,阻碍当地商业发展。
非洲若要实现繁荣,非洲人若要进入地球村,中国对非洲资源的持续渴求将提供必要的手段。如果中国跌倒,非洲也会受损。但如果中国为非洲国家和统治者创造就业机会,支持处于萌芽期的非洲商业实体,而不是与它们竞争,中非关系会比现在更加互利互惠。

世界多国争相强化对非洲关系
05/06/2013 |齐藤德彦、杉崎慎弥 |朝日新闻
在日本举行的第5届非洲开发会议 (TICAD)从一个侧面反映了日本与中国之间的对抗。日本方面表示希望以后也在日本继续召开该会议。但是,因经济增长而越来越自信的非洲首脑们开始主张“在非洲召开该会议”。目前,非洲作为全球下一个经济增长中心,正受到世界各国的热切关注。

  “中国长久以来一直在力所能及的范围内无私地支援非洲,这一点今后也将持续下去。”
  中国外交部发言人洪磊于本月3日的例行记者会上,面对“日本是否在通过TICAD与中国进行对抗”这一提问时如是强调道。从这一回答中可以窥见,在支援非洲方面,中国有自信将日本和其他发达国家远远甩在身后。
  1991年以来,中国历届外长每年都将首次出访的对象选为非洲国家。今年3月出任国家主席的习近平,也在同月将首次出访的目的地选在南非和坦桑尼亚。2000年起,中国每三年召集非洲各国部长等高官举行一次“中非合作论坛”。其形式为中非双边交替主办。
  中国所提供的支援并不仅限于两国之间,而是尝试推进多国间的多边框架下的大规模资金援助。中国和巴西、俄罗斯、印度、南非共同提倡设立“金砖国家(BRICS)开发银行”,如果该计划得以实现,可以预见大部分融资将会流向非洲。
  韩国和印度、土耳其等国也为了与非洲加强关系而举办类似于TICAD的国际会议。
  韩国自2006年起,每3年召集首脑级人物和部长级官员举办一次论坛。去年10月在首尔召开的论坛中曾明确表示韩国政府将在2年内拿出5亿9千万美元的“政府开发援助”(ODA)。据悉,该论坛已经达成共识,决定从下届开始将与非洲国家交替主办。
  印度和土耳其也于2008年起分别与非洲召开“峰会”。印度曾于2011年的会议上表示,准备贷款50亿美元给非洲。土耳其的目标是实现对非贸易额的跨越式增长。
  各国首脑访问非洲也日趋频繁。仅2010年以来的3年间,韩国前总统李明博和印度总理辛格频繁访问非洲。土耳其总理埃尔多安也在今年1月访问了非洲三国。
  另一方面,日本首相中,自2006年小泉纯一郎访问过埃塞俄比亚和加纳之后,就没有再访问撒哈拉沙漠以南的非洲各国了。


援助非洲日本无力抗衡中国
29/05/2013 |崎慎弥、牧野爱博 |朝日新闻
3月下旬,在莫桑比克北部1名中国男子和7名身穿背后印有“CHINA”字样的莫桑比克男子驾驶2台重型机械对红褐色的土地进行平整作业。
  他们是一家总部位于中国河南省的国有企业的员工,该公司在约350公里的道路建设工程中承包下了约130公里。这家中国企业在国际竞标中,按照当时汇率以约36亿7400万日元的价格中标。这一工程建设总经费约为263亿日元,由日本和非洲开发银行、韩国进出口银行合作进行共同融资。日本通过国际协力机构(JICA)筹措了约59亿8千万日元的贷款。
  我向在现场施工的一名莫桑比克人(26岁)询问是在哪个国家援助下施工的,他反问:“不是中国还能是哪儿?”附近农民也说:“(我们也)觉得是中国的援助。”谁也没听说过日本。
  去年秋天,日本政府和位于非洲东部的吉布提进行了接触,日方事前通过国际协力机构(JICA)试探在港湾改建等工程方面提供无偿资金援助。
  吉布提和日本两国以自卫队应对海盗的活动为契机急速拉进了距离。由吉布提政府提供场地,日本于2012年1月在当地开设了大使馆。吉布提资源匮乏,港口是其主要收入来源。这里的港口主要负责处理来自埃塞俄比亚的货物。日本方面认为,吉布提一定会很高兴地接受日方支援。
  但是,吉布提政府的回答却出乎日方预料:“港口确实非常重要,我们要新建4个港口。其中三个中国会给我们建的,剩下一个已经拜托了加拿大。”
  将走向海洋作为国家战略的中国,从很久以前就将目光转向了临近亚丁湾和红海的吉布提。吉布提外交部等政府设施中大多数也是在中国支援下建成的。2011年夏天,陷入粮食危机的吉布提向各国请求支援,中国送给吉布提的粮食比其他国家多出了1位数,让各国驻吉布提的大使都震惊了。
  数年前,当日本向坦桑尼亚提出援建巴加莫约港时,也被坦桑尼亚以“让中国帮我们”为由拒绝了。日本调查后发现,中国向坦桑尼亚宣传“将来把巴加莫约建成像深圳一样的经济特区”,而且据说还提议铺设连结港口的公路和铁道。
  现在,坦桑尼亚到处可见中国援建的建筑物,如国家体育场、防卫研究所、火力发电站等。日本外务省干部感叹说:“日本被经合组织(OECD)开发援助委员会(DAC)制定的严格规则所束缚,没有加盟这一机构的中国与我们相比非常自由,我们原本就站在不同的起跑线上。
  日本的援助多以考虑民生为主,中国的支援项目则集中于政府机构和道路建设,这些项目会让政府当局感到高兴。
  “他们(中国)的目标不是那个国家的民众,而是和中国利益直接相关的当权者。”
  此外,中国所使用的廉价建材和从本国带来工人实施“低成本援助”也很有魅力。另外一名外务省干部谈道:“用同样的钱修路,日本只能修几公里,而中国能修50公里。”对于非洲政府的反应,他表示:“比起建造一台高性能的电梯,(非洲政府)认为,建造5台便宜的电梯也很好,哪怕没多久就坏了一半。
  在非洲,日本和中国的地位也在不断拉开差距。
  中国对非洲的贸易进出口额达到约1300亿美元,而日本只有约250亿美元。对非洲投资总额,中日对比则是14亿美元对5亿美元。在非洲居住的本国国民,中国有82万人,而日本只有8000人。在设有本国大使馆的非洲国家数量之比为49对32。已有专家指出,日本没有能力与中国进行正面竞争。

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